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Abstract
Previous studies suggest that emissions taxes are more efficient at stimulating the
development of improved pollution abatement technologies than other policy instruments,
such as (non-auctioned) tradable emissions permits.  We present results from a competitive
model that cast some doubt on the empirical importance of this assertion.  For example, we
find that efficiency in the market for “environmental R&D” under tradable permits is typically
less than 6 percent lower than that under an emissions tax for innovations that reduce
pollution abatement costs by 10 percent or less.  However the discrepancy is more significant
in the case of more major innovations.
We also find that the presence of R&D spillovers per se does not necessarily imply
large inefficiency in the R&D market.  For example, efficiency in the R&D market under a
Pigouvian emissions tax is generally more than 90 percent of that in the first best outcome if
the private benefit from innovation exceeds 50 percent of the social benefit.  Thus the R&D
spillover effect must substantially limit the private benefit from R&D in our analysis for there
be a potentially “large” efficiency gain from additional policies -- such as research subsidies --
to stimulate innovation.
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POLLUTION REGULATION AND THE EFFICIENCY GAINS
FROM TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION
Ian W. H. Parry*
1.   INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, economists have focused on the static efficiency impacts of pollution
regulations.1  These are determined by the environmental benefits and economic costs from
instantaneous reductions in pollution, given the current state of technology.  In a dynamic
context however, the state of technology is endogenous.  This means that pollution regulations
can also affect efficiency through their impact on the incentives for technological innovation.
This paper focuses on the efficiency gain from “environmental R&D” -- that is, R&D into
improved pollution abatement technologies -- induced by alternative environmental policy
instruments.  We refer to this as the R&D efficiency gain.
The potential for an R&D efficiency gain arises because of two potential externality
problems associated with environmental R&D.  First, innovating firms are unlikely to take
into account spillover benefits to other firms in an industry that might be able to adopt new
abatement technologies.  Second -- in the absence of regulation -- firms may lack incentives
to adopt technologies that produce environmental benefits.
Previous studies have shown that emissions taxes are potentially more effective at
stimulating environmental R&D than other instruments such as (non-auctioned) tradable
emissions permits and performance standards.2  The problem with tradable permits is that the
diffusion of cleaner technologies drives down the equilibrium permit price.  This reduces the
private gains from adopting cleaner technologies, since these gains include the revenues from
selling “spare” emissions permits.3  The problem with a performance standard is that firms
may not reduce the level of emissions per unit of output to the ex post optimal level,
following the adoption of a cleaner technology.  Again, this reduces the private benefit from
adopting cleaner technologies.  (These issues are discussed in more detail below).
                                               
* Fellow, Energy and Natural Resources Division, Resources for the Future.  I am grateful to Dallas Burtraw,
Jim Boyd, Mike Toman, and other colleagues at RFF for very helpful comments and suggestions.
1 See for example the survey in Cropper and Oates (1992).
2 For analytical models see Milliman and Prince (1989), Downing and White (1986), Jung et al. (1996) and
Parry (1996).  Econometric studies find that environmental policies have had a significant effect on the
incentives to invent and adopt cleaner technologies over time (for example Newell et al., 1996), and that these
incentives are greater under emissions taxes and tradable emissions permits than command and control
regulations (Jaffe and Stavins, 1995).
3 However this problem could be avoided if the permits were auctioned by the regulatory agency (Milliman and
Prince, 1989) or if the regulatory agency were willing to buy back permits at the initial market price (Parry, 1996).Ian W. H. Parry RFF 98-04
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In addition, previous studies have shown that even under an emissions tax (set at the
Pigouvian level) the amount of environmental R&D may be suboptimal.4  This is because an
innovating firm may not be able to appropriate the full social benefits from a new technology
when there are spillover benefits to other firms.  This suggests there may be an important case
for stimulating more innovation, either by raising the level of emissions tax or by using
supplementary instruments such as research subsidies and prizes.
This paper investigates under what conditions there might be a potentially “large”
R&D efficiency gain from using emissions taxes over other policy instruments and from
stimulating additional innovation under an emissions tax.  We begin by deriving the first-best
efficiency gain from environmental R&D using a social planning model.  We then derive the
R&D efficiency gain in a decentralized version of the model under an emissions tax, a
performance standard and tradable emissions permits, assuming the Pigouvian level of
regulation is imposed.  Simulations of the relative R&D efficiency gain in each case are then
presented, using a wide range of values for the relevant parameters.
We find that efficiency in the R&D market is not necessarily much lower under
tradable permits than emissions taxes, assuming environmental policies are set at ex ante
optimal levels.  This crucially depends on the potential size of innovations, since this
determines whether the impact on the permit price will be substantial or not.  For example, the
R&D efficiency gain is typically less than 6 percent lower than that under the emissions tax
for an innovation that reduces pollution abatement costs by 10 percent or less.  It is around
10-40 percent lower for innovations that reduce abatement costs by 40 percent.  The relative
efficiency discrepancy between the emissions tax and performance standard is somewhat
larger, although again is very sensitive to the potential size of innovation.  Moreover, the
efficiency differences between the policy instruments would be eliminated, more-or-less, if
the instruments could be adjusted to their ex post Pigouvian levels following innovation.
We also find that the presence of R&D spillovers per se does not necessarily imply
large inefficiencies in the R&D market.  For example, if the private benefit from innovation is
50 percent or more of the social benefit, the R&D efficiency gain under the emissions tax is at
least 90 percent of that in the first-best outcome.  This is because a “common pool” effect
tends to counteract the effect of imperfect appropriability.  Competition for a given amount of
innovation rent is excessive because firms do not take into account the impact of their
research on reducing the likelihood that other firms will obtain imitation rents.  However, in
cases where the lack of appropriability leads to a more dramatic divergence between the
private and social benefits from innovation, the efficiency gains from inducing additional
environmental R&D can be more substantial.
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Our model is simplified in a number of respects to keep the analysis transparent and
tractable.  For example, we ignore heterogeneity among firms and the possibility of strategic
behavior in the R&D market.  Nonetheless the analysis does provide a useful starting point for
assessing under what conditions the R&D efficiency gain from using emissions taxes over
other environmental policy instruments, or using additional incentives to stimulate innovation,
are likely to be empirically important or not.
The next section outlines the model and derives the first-best R&D efficiency gain
from the social planner’s optimization problem.  The following three sections solve the
decentralized version of the model under an emissions tax, performance standard and tradable
emissions permits, and present the empirical results.  Section 6 concludes and discusses some
qualifications to the results.
2. THE SOCIAL PLANNING MODEL5
In this section we begin by describing the model assumptions.  We then solve the
social planner’s optimization problem for the first-best level of production, waste emissions
and environmental R&D.  This enables us to derive the first-best R&D efficiency gain.
Finally, we describe some additional assumptions necessary to solve the decentralized version
of the model in subsequent sections.
A. Model Assumptions
Throughout the analysis we employ quadratic functional forms; that is, marginal
benefits and marginal costs are assumed to be linear.  This assumption (in general) enables us
to solve the model analytically.6
We assume that a large number of identical firms produce a good X that is consumed by
households (for example electricity).  The inverse demand function for X is P(X), where P¢ < 0
and P¢¢ = 0. X is produced under constant returns to scale and the cost per unit of producing X is
c > 0.  Therefore the supply curve of X is perfectly elastic.  We choose units of X such that each
firm produces one unit.7
                                               
5 The analytical model used below shares some features of that in Parry (1995), which in turn merged a model of
the R&D market by Wright (1983) with a model of an environmental externality.  The model below differs from
that in Parry (1995) by allowing for variability in the emissions to final output ratio, and in considering a wider
range of policy instruments.  Unlike Parry (1995), we also implement the model empirically.
6 Our objective is to indicate approximate empirical magnitudes using explicit formulas.  To empirically solve
the model under non-quadratic functional forms would typically require numerical simulation techniques.  This
can provide more accuracy, but at the expense of less transparency.
7 Allowing firms to have U-shaped average cost curves and to choose their level of output does not affect the
results of the analysis.                                                                                7
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Equation (5.8¢) says that the social benefit from diffusing the new technology equals that in
the first-best case.  This follows because both emissions and output are adjusted to their ex
post optimal levels in the discovery state.  Comparing (5.16¢) with (4.16), patent holder
revenue exceeds that under the emissions tax.  This occurs for two reasons.  First, the private
gains from using the cleaner technology, as opposed to the imitation, are greater in Figure 2
by triangle yzv than under the tax, since the required emissions reduction in the discovery
state is fixed at De2
*.  This raises the maximum license fee that production firms are willing to
pay.  Second, the equilibrium number of production firms is greater ( X X
t
2 2
* >  in Figure 1).
B.   Simulations
The upper half of Table 2 shows the R&D efficiency gain under the fixed emissions
standard, expressed relative to that under the emissions tax (using equations (4.8), (4.12), (4.16),
(5.8), (5.16), and the previous parameter ranges).  These simulations suggest that the R&D
efficiency gain may be significantly lower under the fixed performance standard than under the
emissions tax.  However, this result is very sensitive to the potential size of the innovation.  The
R&D efficiency gain under the performance standard is about 15-20 percent lower than under the
tax, for an innovation that would reduce abatement costs by 10 percent.  It is 1-3 percent and 46-
71 percent lower for innovations that would reduce abatement costs by 1 percent and 40 percent
respectively.  The explanation for this is clear from Figure 2.  The larger the reduction in
(marginal) abatement costs, the greater is the size of triangle tuv relative to triangle 0tu.  Hence
the greater is the social benefit from diffusion of the cleaner technology under the emissions tax
relative to that under the performance standard.  In addition, the larger the innovation, the larger
the size of area syvu relative to area 0su, hence the greater is patent holder revenue under the
emissions tax relative to that under the performance standard.  This implies lower efficiency
under the performance standard (in cases when R&D is below the first-best level).
The lower half of Table 2 shows the R&D efficiency gain under the flexible performance
standard expressed relative to that under the emissions tax (using equations (4.8), (4.12), (4.16),
(5.8¢) and (5.16¢)).  In general these estimates are very close to unity implying that the R&D
efficiency gain under the flexible performance standard is almost identical to that under the
emissions tax.  This is because the social gain from diffusion is greater when the performance
standard is flexible than when it is fixed.  However, the flexible standard is more likely to
generate an excessive amount of R&D because firms’ willingness to pay for the new technology
exceeds that under the emissions tax by triangle yzv in Figure 2.  This is especially the case when
the reduction in abatement costs -- and hence triangle yzv -- is “large” and when the imitation
effect is weak.24
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cleaner technology, but not all the way to De2
* in Figure 2.  This is because the permit price falls
below h as permit holders sell spare permits to entrants (and emissions abatement is proportional
to the permit price in (6.3a)).  Second, the willingness to pay for licensing the new technology,
and hence patent holder revenue, is lower under tradable permits than under the emissions tax.
This is because the fall in permit price reduces the private gains to production firms from
adopting the new technology and selling emissions permits.
However the discrepancy between tradable permits and the emissions tax is only
empirically “significant” for major innovations, when the fall in permit price is more
substantial.  For an innovation that reduces abatement costs by 10 percent or less, the R&D
efficiency gain is only up to around 6 percent lower under tradable permits than under the
emissions tax.  However, it is 10-40 percent lower for an innovation that reduces abatement
costs by 40 percent.
The lower panel of Table 3 shows the results for the flexible policy when the quantity
of permits is reduced prior to diffusion of the cleaner technology.  In this case the R&D
efficiency gain is very similar to that under the emissions tax.  Again, diffusion of the cleaner
technology causes a fall in the permit price.  However the initial permit price is greater than in
the fixed permits case.  This implies greater revenues for the patent holder, and a higher level
of emissions abatement with the cleaner technology.
In general, the case of fixed emissions permits is probably more realistic than that of
flexible emissions permits.  The existing programs for controlling sulfur dioxide and nitrogen
oxides set the quantity of allowable emissions over a 15-year time horizon.  It is unlikely that
the announced targets will be renegotiated during the intervening years.  Similarly, if the U.S.
adopts a tradable permits program to reduce carbon dioxide emissions the quantity of permits
allocated each year is likely to be fixed in advance over a long time horizon.
6.   CONCLUSION
This paper analyzes the welfare effect in the market for environmental R&D induced by
alternative environmental policy instruments.  The induced welfare gain is greater under an
emissions tax than tradable emissions permits.  However, we find that the empirical significance
of this discrepancy crucially depends on the potential size of innovation.  For an innovation that
reduces abatement costs by 10 percent or less, the R&D efficiency gain is only up to around 6
percent lower under tradable permits than under the emissions tax.  However, it is 10-40 percent
lower for an innovation that reduces abatement costs by 40 percent.  The efficiency
discrepancies between an emissions tax and a fixed performance standard are somewhat larger,
although again they are very sensitive to the potential size of innovations.
The possibility that new, cleaner production technologies will be imitated by other
firms can reduce the private benefits from innovation below the social benefits.  This suggests
that inducing more environmental R&D -- for example by research subsidies or tighteningIan W. H. Parry RFF 98-04
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environmental regulations beyond the Pigouvian level -- may significantly improve efficiency
in the R&D market.  The above results cast some doubt on this assertion.  We find that
efficiency in the R&D market is generally more than 90 percent of that in the first-best
outcome, even when imitation limits private benefits to 50 percent of the social benefits from
innovation.  This is because the common pool effect -- by which competition for innovation
rents is excessive -- tends to offset the effects of imitation.  Thus in our analysis the threat of
imitation has to be substantial before research subsidies can potentially produce “large”
efficiency gains in the R&D market.
Our analysis does not examine the choice between R&D policy instruments.  However
our results underscore that the potential efficiency gain from additional incentives to stimulate
environmental R&D is highly sensitive to the discrepancy between the private and social
benefit from innovation.  This suggests that a policy that subsidizes all environmental R&D at
the same rate -- such as the existing R&D tax credit -- is potentially inefficient.  A more
efficient policy might be to target research prizes at new emissions abatement technologies for
which it is particularly difficult to appropriate spillover benefits to other firms.
Our analysis provides a useful starting point for assessing under what circumstances
there might be significant inefficiency in the R&D market under alternative environmental
policies.  However, there are many ways the analysis might be extended to examine how
robust the empirical results are.  The model employs quadratic functional forms.  Allowing
for more general functional forms may affect the quantitative results to some extent, although
this is unlikely in the case of more minor innovations.  We assumed the environmental
damage function is linear.  Under a convex damage function the private benefits from
innovation under the Pigouvian emissions tax can exceed the social benefits.  This is because
marginal environmental benefits from diffusing a cleaner technology are declining, while
marginal private benefits, in terms of reduced tax payments, are constant.  Thus the possibility
of R&D exceeding the first-best level appears to be more likely under convex damages.29
The analysis does not investigate the implications of heterogeneity among firms or the
empirical significance of possible strategic behavior in the R&D market.  Nor do we allow for
transaction costs when analyzing tradable emissions permits.  These transactions costs may
reduce the returns to innovation and hence the incentives for environmental R&D (Parry,
1996).  Our analysis also ignores the possibility that technological innovation may arise from
learning by doing, rather than deliberate investments in research activity.30
                                               
29 For more discussion of this see Parry (1995).
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